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Resumo		Este	 artigo	 trata	 da	 elaboração	 e	 uso	 do	 conceito	 de	 estrutura	 básica	 da	constituição	 em	 diferentes	 jurisdições,	 principalmente	 da	 Europa	 e	 da	América	Latina.	Por	meio	dessa	análise	comparada,	pretende-se	provar	que	o	critério	 empregado	 para	 o	 julgamento	 constitucional	 de	 emendas	 tem	 um	alcance	e	conteúdo	específicos,	e	que	tanto	o	alcance	quanto	o	conteúdo	são	decididos	principalmente	pelos	tribunais.	Depois	de	explicar	os	argumentos	que	os	tribunais	empregaram	para	justificar	seu	papel,	o	artigo	se	concentra	nas	diferentes	denominações	de	“estrutura	básica”	no	conjunto	dos	estudos	de	 casos	 selecionados,	 concentrando-se,	 finalmente,	 no	papel	 dos	 tribunais	constitucionais	e	supremos.	
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Abstract	This	 article	 deals	 with	 the	 elaboration	 and	 use	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 basic	structure	of	the	constitution	in	different	jurisdiction,	especially	from	Europe	and	Latin	America.	Through	this	comparative	analysis,	 it	aims	to	prove	that	the	yardstick	employed	for	constitutional	adjudication	on	amendments	has	a	specific	 scope	 and	 content,	 and	 that	 both	 scope	 and	 content	 are	 mainly	decided	by	courts.	After	explaining	the	arguments	courts	have	employed	 in	order	 to	 justify	 their	 role,	 it	 focuses	 on	 the	 different	 denominations	 of	 the	
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“basic	structure”	in	the	set	of	the	selected	case	studies,	finally	concentrating	on	the	role	of	constitutional	and	supreme	courts.	
Keywords:	 constitutional	 adjudication,	 constitutional	 amendments,		comparative	law,	yardstick,	basic	structure.		 	
Introduction		
The	 paper	 analyzes,	 from	 a	 comparative	 perspective,	 the	 elaboration	 by	 Supreme	 and	
Constitutional	Courts	of	the	concept	of	“basic	structure”	 lato	sensu,	 i.e.	a	series	of	elements	that	
cannot	 be	 amended	 because	 their	 change	 would	 lead	 to	 the	
replacement/annulment/dismemberment	(Albert,	2018)	of	the	original	constitution.	
Through	several	examples	from	Europe	and	Latin	America,	the	text	examines	the	arguments	
and	grounds	used	by	comparative	jurisprudence	in	order	to	construe	and	implement	such	limits	to	
the	amending	power.	 It	 also	differentiates	between	diverse	amending	procedures,	 explaining	 to	
what	extent	 the	 corresponding	Courts	have	adopted	distinct	 yardsticks	according	 to	 the	 specific	
procedure	and	its	level	of	inclusiveness.	
The	paper	has	as	background	the	Indian	case	law,	because	it	provided	the	first	elaboration	of	
the	concept	of	“basic	structure”2,	which	has	been	widely	analyzed	by	the	scholarship	(see	at	least	
Lakshminath,	2002;	Krishnaswamy,	2011;	Basu,	2014;	Seervai,	2015;	Joshi,	2015;	on	the	historical	
and	 political	 aspects,	 as	well	 as	 a	 chronological	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 connections	 between	 the	
Supreme	Court	of	 India	 and	 legislative	 and	executive	powers,	 see	Thiruvengadam,	2017;	Albert,	
Nakashidze,	Olcay,	2018;	Dixon,	Landau,	2015),	assessing	the	elements	of	similarity	and	difference	
with	respect	to	posterior	uses	of	similar	doctrines	by	other	national	Courts.	
For	each	case,	all	 the	relevant	 formants	 (Sacco,	1991)	are	considered:	constitutional	clauses	
on	constitutional	amendments’	limits;	doctrinal	reconstructions	of	those	limits	and	scholarship	on	
the	 corresponding	 role	 of	 the	 Courts;	 finally,	 domestic	 case	 law.	 In	 particular,	 the	 arguments	
employed	by	Courts	in	order	to	justify	their	own	intervention,	as	well	as	the	scope	of	the	yardstick	
used	in	the	review	are	critically	assessed.	
Overall,	the	paper	aims	to	prove	three	main	assumptions	through	the	comparative	analysis:	
	
1. that	the	yardstick	used	in	the	adjudication	on	constitutional	amendments	only	consists	of	
the	 “basic	 structure”	 or	 basic/fundamental	 /supreme	 principles	 or	 identity	 of	 the	
constitution,	needing	to	be	kept	separate	from	the	yardstick	employed	in	ordinary	judicial	
review	of	legislation;	
2. that	 that	yardstick,	differently	named	 in	each	 legal	 system,	can	always	be	 related	 to	 the	
concept	of	“democracy”,	although	just	sometimes	it	 is	explicitly	phrased	and	labeled	this	
way,	especially	with	reference	to	the	separation	of	powers;	3. that	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 “basic	 structure”	 is	 devoted	mainly	 to	 judicial	 elaboration,	
even	 for	 those	 countries	 whose	 constitution	 contains	 explicit	 clauses	 limiting	 the	
amending	power.		
																																								 																				2	See	the	leading	case	Kesavananda	Bharati	v.	State	of	Kerala	and	Another	(1973)	4	SCC	225,	in	which	this	expression	is	used	for	the	first	time.			
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The	paper	emphasizes	the	migration	and	diffusion	of	the	concept	of	“basic	structure”	 in	the	
selected	 case	 studies,	 inferring	 ideas	 from	 the	 comparative	 analysis	 in	 order	 to	 assess	 to	 what	
extent	 there	has	been	 circulation	of	 arguments	 and	 ideas,	 in	 particular	within	 Europe	 and	 Latin	
America.	Focusing	on	these	two	areas	will	enrich	the	debates	on	contemporary	legal	comparison	
and	potential	global	scholarship,	proposing	original	conclusions,	drawing	 inspiration	 from	on	the	
Indian	doctrine	and	the	other	comparable	doctrines.		
Constitutional	 courts	 justifying	 their	 role	 in	 safeguarding	 the	basic	
structure	of	the	Constitution		
Constitutional	 adjudication	 on	 constitutional	 amendments	 differs	 from	 the	 control	 of	
legislation	 not	 from	 the	 subjective	 point	 of	 view	 (as	 the	 subjects	 involved	 are	 normally	 the	
Constitutional/Supreme	Court	and	the	legislator	as	it	happens	with	ordinary	legislation)	but	from	
the	objective	perspective.	The	object	of	the	control	is	represented	by	hierarchically	higher	norms,	
endowed	with	 the	 force	 to	modify,	by	means	of	a	 change,	addition	or	abrogation,	a	part	of	 the	
constitution.	
The	procedure	for	passing	such	norms	is	different	from	the	one	to	be	used	to	adopt	ordinary	
legislation,	 generally	 requiring	 a	 higher	 majority/consensus	 or	 additional	 forms	 of	 procedural	
complexity.	Such	sources	are	still	an	expression	of	a	constituted	power,	regulated	and	limited	by	
the	 constitution	 itself,	 independently	 from	 the	 various	 denominations	 attributed	 to	 it	 (for	
example,	in	Latin	America,	expressions	like	poder	constituyente	derivado	are	common).	
Additionally,	 if	the	object	of	control	 is	not	an	ordinary	law,	nor	is	 it	the	original	constitution,	
i.e.	the	outcome	of	the	work	of	the	constituent	power.	
The	 number	 of	 cases	 that	 prove	 this	 point	 is	 wide.	 One	 can	 recall	 the	 judgments	 by	 the	
Chilean	Constitutional	Court	on	its	lack	of	jurisdiction	concerning	the	constitutionality	of	the	1980	
constitution	(Judgments	n.	46,	21/12/1987	and	n.	272,	18/3/1998);	the	first	decisions	by	the	Constitutional	 Chamber	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Costa	 Rica	 (Judgments	 1-92	 and	 2-92),	 as	well	 as	 the	 judgments	 by	 the	Mexican	 Supreme	 Court	 in	 the	 case	Manuel	 Camacho	 Solís	 v.	
Congress	of	the	Union	and	others	(Judgment	on	the	“Amparo	en	revisión”	1334/1998).	In	these	judgments,	 a	 specific	 philosophical	 argument	 is	 (at	 least	 implicitly)	 employed,	 namely	 the	apagogical	 argument	 or	 reductio	 ad	 absurdum:	 if	 the	 source	 of	 law	 that	 established	 the	
corresponding	Court	were	to	be	struck	down,	consequently	also	the	decision	taken	by	the	Court	
itself	would	lack	legitimacy.	
The	 exception	 to	 this	 trend	 is	 shown	 by	 the	 judgment	 adopted	 on	 April	 22,	 2015	 by	 the	
Constitutional	 Chamber	 of	 the	 Honduran	 Supreme	 Court	 (Landau,	 Dixon,	 Roznai,	 2019).	 In	 that	
decision,	 in	fact,	the	original	unamendable	provision	included	in	the	1982	Honduran	constitution	
concerning	presidential	re-election	was	struck	down.	
With	 the	 exclusion	 of	 this	 case,	 comparative	 case	 law	 shows	 the	 intention	 to	 differentiate	
between	 the	norms	 contained	 in	 the	original	 constitution	 and	 the	 amendments,	 as	Courts	 treat	
them,	 in	 the	 first	 case,	 as	 parts	 of	 the	original	 source	 and,	 in	 the	 second,	 as	 “derived”	 sources,	
outcome	of	the	exercise	of	a	constituted	power.	
Different	arguments	have	been	used	by	Courts	in	order	to	justify	their	check	on	constitutional	
amendments.	 I	am	 inclined	to	classify	 them	through	a	 threefold	partition	 (Ragone,	2013):	a)	 the	
existence	of	eternity	clauses	postulates	a	control	over	their	respect;	b)	constitutional	amendments	
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are	 hierarchically	 lower	with	 respect	 to	 constitutional	 fundamental	 principles;	 c)	 judicial	 review	
represents	one	of	the	elements	of	the	“basic	structure”	as	such	(as	it	is	in	the	Indian	case).	
Concerning	 the	 reasoning	 sub	 a),	 the	 German	 case	 is	 of	 great	 interest:	 the	 constitution	
contains	 in	 Article	 79	 an	 eternity	 clause	 that	 forbids	 that	 the	 organization	 of	 the	 Federation	 in	
Länder	 be	 modified,	 as	 well	 as	 their	 participation	 in	 the	 legislative	 activity	 and	 the	 principles	
established	 in	 Articles	 1	 and	 20	 of	 the	 constitution	 (Lücke,	 2007).	 The	 irreformable	 aspects	 are	
essentially	 related	 to	 two	areas,	 federalism	and	the	protection	of	human	rights.	The	set	of	 rules	
that	determine	 the	 “constitutional	 identity”	 include	human	dignity,	 inviolable	human	 rights,	 the	
obligation	of	public	powers	to	respect	and	implement	such	rights	-	Article	1	-	and	the	configuration	
of	the	State	as	federal,	social,	democratic	and	based	on	the	rule	of	law	-	Article	20	-	(Hain,	1999;	
Heun,	2011).	
The	 Federal	 Constitutional	 Court	 has	 repeatedly	 affirmed	 that	 it	 is	 authorized	 to	 verify	 the	
consistency	 of	 constitutional	 amendments	 with	 those	 clauses.	 The	 most	 known	 case	 occurred	
after	the	reform	of	the	regulation	of	telephone	tapping	(so-called	G-10	Gesetz),	which	was	legally	
permitted	since	1968,	diminishing	privacy	and	secrecy	of	communications.	The	tapping	was	carried	
out	without	the	 intercepted	being	 informed	and	was	ordered	and	supervised	by	a	parliamentary	
commission,	 without	 any	 judicial	 intervention.	 The	 Federal	 Constitutional	 Court	 did	 not	 strike	
down	 the	 reform,	 framing	 it	 as	 an	 exception	 connected	 to	 an	 extraordinary	 situation	 (BVerfGE	
30,1,	1970).	
There	were	 some	 subsequent	 cases,	 such	 as	 the	 reform	 of	 political	 asylum	 (1993)	 and	 the	
changes	to	the	surveillance	on	suspects	of	serious	crimes	(1998),	which	also	were	not	considered	
contrary	to	the	core	of	human	rights	(BVerfGE	109,	279,	2004).	Again,	the	Court	considered	that	
these	were	 proportionate	 tools	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 public	 interest	 pursued,	 and	 they	 provided	
sufficient	guarantees	(Leisner,	1999;	Palermo,	2008).	
Another	decision	was	adopted	concerning	the	amendment	that	followed	the	reunification	of	
the	country:	Article	143	established	that	people	whose	property	had	been	expropriated	between	
1945	 and	 1949	 (i.e.	 during	 the	 Soviet	 occupation)	 were	 not	 entitled	 to	 any	 restitution.	 Several	
affected	individuals	filed	individual	complaints	(so-called	Verfassungsbeschwerde),	but	the	Federal	
Constitutional	Court	found	that	the	reform	did	not	affect	the	right	of	property,	because	the	norm	
referred	 to	 expropriations	 accepted	 by	 international	 legal	 standards	 and	 enforced	 before	 the	
constitution	itself	had	entered	into	force	(see	BVerfGE	84,90,	1991,	and	also	BVerfGE	94,12,	1996).	
In	general,	in	the	German	case,	the	existence	of	the	eternity	clause	proved	essential,	because	
it	 was	 used	 to	 support	 the	 intervention	 of	 the	 Court	 as	 the	 defender	 of	 the	 identity	 of	 the	
constitution.	Otherwise,	the	only	protection	of	the	constitution	would	be	the	will	and	good	faith	of	
political	 actors.	 In	 light	 of	 the	 consistent	 jurisprudence	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 significant	 opposite	
theorizations,	 scholarly	works	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 eternity	 clause	 and	 the	 concrete	 judgments	
more	than	the	analysis	of	the	theoretical-general	scope	of	the	question	(Pfersmann,	1993).	
Concerning	 the	 argument	 sub	 b),	 the	 assimilation	 (to	 a	 certain	 extent)	 of	 constitutional	
amendments	to	ordinary	legislation	has	been	employed	to	affirm	that	constitutional	adjudication	
on	amendments	derives	logically	from	the	hierarchy	of	norms.	The	idea	is	that	all	amendments	are	
subordinate	 to	 the	constitution	as	 they	are	regulated	and	 limited	by	 it,	although	the	yardstick	 is	
more	restricted	in	comparison	with	the	one	that	has	to	be	used	for	ordinary	legislation,	covering	
exclusively	the	supreme	principles	or	the	basic	structure.	
The	 empirical	 analysis	 proves	 that	 no	 reasoning	 is	 based	 exclusively	 on	 just	 one	 of	 the	
arguments,	but	some	Courts	have	relied	mainly	on	this	thesis	(Ragone,	2012).	
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In	 Italy,	 the	 first	decisions	 in	which	 the	Constitutional	Court	elaborated	a	 sort	of	division	of	
constitutional	norms	according	to	their	hierarchical	value	were	related	to	canon	law	and	European	
law.	When	establishing	 the	 limits	 of	 these	 two	 sets	 of	 norms	when	 they	merge	with	 the	 Italian	
legal	 system,	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 held	 that	 they	 could	 not	 violate	 certain	 constitutional	
principles	(while	they	generally	prevail	over	other	provisions)3.	
Later,	 also	 recalling	 these	 previous	 judgments,	 the	 Court	 identified	 an	 unchangeable	 hard	
core,	 which	 is	 composed	 by	 both	 the	 explicit	 eternity	 clause	 of	 the	 constitution	 (Article	 139,	
according	 to	 which	 the	 Republican	 form	 of	 State	 shall	 not	 be	 a	 matter	 for	 constitutional	
amendment)	 and	 other	 supreme	 principles	 that	 define	 its	 identity.	 Judgment	 n.	 1146/1988	
represented	the	point	of	departure	of	this	doctrine.	Replying	to	the	question	raised	by	the	judge	of	
the	specific	case,	the	Court	stated	that	“the	Italian	constitution	contains	some	supreme	principles	
that	cannot	be	subverted	nor	modified	in	their	essential	content,	not	even	through	constitutional	
amendments	 or	 other	 constitutional	 laws”.	 These	 are	 the	 principles	 that	 the	 constitution	 itself	
explicitly	 fixes	as	 limits	 to	 the	amending	power,	 such	as	 the	Republican	 form	-	Article	139	 -,	but	
also	 the	 principles	 that,	 despite	 not	 being	 expressly	 mentioned	 among	 those	 norms	 that	 are	
exempted	 from	 constitutional	 amendment	 procedures,	 belong	 to	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 supreme	
values	on	which	 the	 Italian	constitution	 is	based.	Once	clarified	 that	certain	elements	cannot	be	
eliminated,	the	Constitutional	Court	attributed	to	itself	the	task	to	verify	the	constitutionality	of	all	
sources	of	constitutional	rank,	because	“if	it	were	not	so,	the	absurd	consequence	would	be	that	
the	mechanisms	of	judicial	protection	of	the	constitution	would	be	ineffective,	precisely	in	relation	
to	 the	 norms	 with	 the	 higher	 rank”	 (which	 means,	 constitutional	 norms	 contained	 either	 in	
amendments	or	constitutional	laws	-	i.e.	laws	that	must	be	passed	through	the	same	procedure	as	
amendments,	but	they	do	not	directly	change	the	text	of	the	constitution).	
The	 conclusion	 of	 the	 argument	 was	 clear-cut:	 if	 there	 were	 no	 supervisor	 of	 the	
amendments,	precisely	those	norms	potentially	able	to	truly	affect	the	fundamental	values	of	the	
constitutional	system	would	be	exempt	 from	any	control.	The	 first	 relevant	element	of	 this	case	
law	 is	 that	 the	express	 limit	 to	 the	amendments	 (the	Republic)	 is	not	 the	only	one,	as	 there	are	
other	 irreformable	principles,	which	are	 those	 that	exemplify	 the	 supreme	values	of	 the	 system	
and	 also	 by	 fundamental	 rights,	 at	 least	 with	 reference	 to	 their	 essential	 content	 (see	 the	
evolution	of	the	scholarship	in	Italy:	Barile,	1967;	Barile,	De	Siervo,	1968;	Reposo,	1972;	Mortati,	
1952;	Luciani,	1992;	Ripepe,	Romboli,	1995;	Romboli,	1996;	Ruggeri,	2000;	Pegoraro,	Ferioli,	2000;	
Guastini,	2003;	Ruggeri,	2005;	Gambino,	2007).		
The	 Yardstick	 in	 Constitutional	 Adjudication	 on	 Constitutional	
Amendments:	a	Variously	called	“Basic	Structure”	–	or	“Identity”		
There	 is	an	additional	 -	and	more	relevant,	 in	my	opinion	 -	objective	aspect	 that	proves	 the	
distinction	 with	 respect	 to	 constitutional	 adjudication	 on	 ordinary	 legislation,	 which	 is	 the	
yardstick	(Ragone,	2012).	
First,	the	yardstick	used	by	Courts	to	check	the	constitutionality	of	amendments	is	necessarily	
“narrower”.	If	it	was	not	so,	every	amendment	would	be	contrary	to	the	constitution	as	long	as	it	
is	changing	 it.	This	corollary	may	not	be	true	exclusively	 for	additions	through	amendments,	but	
still	the	result	would	be	absurd.		
																																								 																				3	 On	 canon	 law,	 see	 judgments	 n.	 30/1971,	 n.	 12/1972,	 n.	 175/1973	 and	 n.	 1/1977.	 On	 European	 law,	 see	 judgments	 n.	183/1973,	n.	170/1984	and	n.	232/1989.	
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As	a	consequence,	Courts	have	to	select	which	violations	actually	lead	to	a	change	of	the	basic	
structure	of	the	constitution.	This	implies	that	the	constitution	cannot	be	represented	(anymore)	
as	a	series	of	norms	with	the	exact	some	value,	as	a	necessity	arises	to	distinguish	between	them	
in	 order	 to	 understand	 which	 ones	 are	 so	 fundamental	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	 subject	 to	
amendments	(Ragone,	2012;	Roznai,	2017).	
From	this	perspective,	constitutions	carry	principles	and	values,	which	altogether	determine	
their	 “basic	 structure”	or	“identity”.	A	 reform,	which,	even	qualifying	as	 such,	had	an	 impact	on	
these	aspects,	should	be	considered	as	the	establishment	of	a	new	constitutional	order,	that	is,	a	
replacement	of	 the	 constitution	as	 the	Colombian	Constitutional	Court	would	name	 it.	 The	 case	
law	of	this	Court	represents	an	excellent	example	of	this	doctrinal	construction.	
The	Colombian	constitution	of	1991,	in	fact,	provides	the	Constitutional	Court	with	the	power	
of	 adjudicating	 on	 the	 so-called	 legislative	 acts,	 which	 are	 constitutional	 amendments	 (Article	
241).	 More	 in	 general,	 this	 Article	 states	 that	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 is	 given	 the	 task	 of	
safeguarding	the	 integrity	and	supremacy	of	 the	constitution,	also	 through	 individual	complaints	
brought	 against	 constitutional	 reforms	 by	 any	 citizen.	 Constitutional	 adjudication	 of	 the	
amendments	can	be	performed,	only	on	procedural	grounds	(“vices	related	to	the	formation”	of	
the	act),	independently	from	the	procedure	adopted	to	pass	them.	
The	 same	 Article	 241	 also	 regulates	 the	 power	 of	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 to	 adjudicate	 a	
priori	 on	 the	 constitutionality	of	 the	 call	 for	 referendum	or	 constituent	Assembly,	 again	only	on	
procedural	 grounds.	 This	 power	 is	 exercised	 automatically,	 with	 no	 need	 for	 any	 specific	
complaint,	 and	 the	 judgment	 constitutes	 res	 iudicata.	 The	 mandate	 of	 the	 Court	 is	 further	
specified	by	Article	379.	
In	the	first	cases,	decided	in	1997,	the	Court	affirmed	that	its	check	would	only	comprehend	
the	verification	of	the	respect	of	all	the	steps	to	be	followed	in	the	special	amending	procedure.	
Also,	 judgment	 C-543/1998	 confirmed	 such	 position,	 because	 this	 kind	 of	 “constitutional	
adjudication	 affect[ed]	 the	 amending	 procedure	 and	 not	 on	 the	 substance	 of	 the	 amendment”.	
The	last	judgment	that	consistently	respected	this	reasoning	was	C-487/2002,	in	which	the	Court	
again	declared	lacking	jurisdiction	on	potential	substantial	vices.	
The	 judgment	 that	 inaugurated	 the	 new	 approach	 of	 the	 Court,	 which	 is	 relevant	 for	 this	
paper,	 was	 C-551/2003,	 in	 which	 law	 n.	 796/2003	 (calling	 for	 a	 referendum	 to	 amend	 the	
constitution)	was	challenged	before	the	Court.	That	 judgment	 is	 the	 leading	case	concerning	the	
replacement	doctrine	as	a	consequence	of	the	conception	of	the	amending	power	as	constituted	-	
opposed	 to	 the	 original	 constituent	 power	 (see	 in	 particular	 Osuna	 Patiño,	 2004;	 Morelli	 Rico,	
2005;	Vila	Casado,	2007;	Cepeda	Espinosa,	Landau,	2017).	
With	 this	 judgment,	 the	 Court	 initiated	 a	 line	 of	 jurisprudence	 which	 remained	 consistent	
throughout	the	posterior	activity.	It	is	based	on	an	interpretation	of	the	procedure,	so	wide	as	to	
comprise	even	what	has	been	denominated	“vice	of	competence”.	Through	creative	hermeneutics,	
the	Court	argues	that	Article	241	enables	 it	 to	verify	whether	the	Congress,	when	amending	the	
constitution,	 was	 acting	 within	 its	 powers	 (=competence)	 or	 not.	 In	 other	 words,	 when	 the	
Congress	 is	 not	 amending,	 but	 replacing	 the	 constitution,	 it	 is	 exercising	 a	 power	 that	 belongs	
exclusively	to	the	original	constituent	power,	that	is,	to	the	people.	
In	the	words	of	the	Court,	the	amending	procedure	entails	the	possibility	of	modifying	certain	
aspects	 of	 the	 constitution,	but	 not	 its	 fundamental	 elements	 nor	 its	 basis,	 and	 consequently,	 it	
does	 not	 imply	 the	 possibility	 of	 replacing	 it.	 Should	 the	 Congress	 go	 beyond	 the	 limits	 of	 the	
amending	 power,	 there	 would	 be	 a	 procedural	 vice	 even	 if	 the	 constitution	 of	 1991	 does	 not	
contain	 any	explicit	 eternity	 clauses.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	Court	 ruled	 that	 the	 subsistence	of	 the	
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competence	 of	 the	 body	 amending	 the	 constitution	 is	 a	 procedural	 matter,	 and	 therefore	
represents	a	potential	yardstick	 for	constitutional	adjudication	on	amendments	according	 to	 the	
aforementioned	Article	241.	
It	was	(and	still	is)	not	clear	which	the	exact	elements	are	that	may	lead	to	the	replacement,	
as	the	Court	just	gave	some	examples	in	this	first	judgment,	such	as	the	hypothetical	replacement	
of	the	democratic,	republican	and	social	form	of	State	based	on	the	rule	of	law	with	a	dictatorship,	
a	monarchy	 or	 a	 totalitarian	 State.	 Throughout	 its	 jurisprudence,	 the	 principles	 that	 have	 been	
considered	 essential	 span	 from	 truly	 paramount	 values,	 such	 as	 democracy,	 to	 relatively	minor	
issues	such	as	the	requirements	to	become	public	officers.	
The	later	judgment	C-1200/2003,	concerning	legislative	act	n.	3/2002	(a	reform	of	the	criminal	
procedural	 code),	 was	 the	 first	 one	 in	 which	 the	 approach	 adopted	 in	 C-551/2003	 was	 further	
pursued.	Differently	 from	the	previous	case,	 it	was	a	case	falling	under	Article	241	n.	1,	and	this	
proved	 that	 the	 Court	 would	 use	 the	 replacement	 doctrine	 for	 any	 kind	 of	 amendment	
independently	 from	 the	 procedure	 used	 to	 pass	 it.	 In	 point	 3,	 the	 Court	 specified	 that	 the	
replacement	cannot	be	understood	as	an	amendment	substituting	the	constitution	from	a	strictly	
formal	 perspective;	 in	 fact,	 the	 change	 must	 be	 of	 such	 magnitude,	 that	 it	 transforms	 the	
constitution	 into	a	completely	different	one.	This	magnitude	does	not	depend	on	the	number	of	
clauses	affected	but	on	the	relevance	of	the	part/parts	amended.	
Again	and	again,	the	Court	denied	performing	a	substantial	control.	In	judgment	C-668/2004,	
for	instance,	 it	stated	that	it	would	not	evaluate	a	potential	violation	of	the	principle	of	equality,	
because	that	would	result	 in	a	check	on	the	merits	of	the	amendment	which	 is	 forbidden	to	the	
Court	and	would	distort	the	logic	of	constitutional	adjudication	itself.	
In	two	judgments	of	2004	(C-970	and	C-971)	the	Court	partially	clarified	the	method	it	would	
follow	when	adjudicating	on	constitutional	reforms,	elaborating	on	the	substitution/replacement	
test	 divided	 into	 three	 steps.	 First,	 the	 essential	 element	 of	 the	 constitution	 which	 has	 been	
replaced	 needs	 to	 be	 identified,	 specifying	 its	 constitutional	 configuration	 through	 multiple	
clauses.	In	fact,	to	prove	that	the	element	is	essential	one	shall	preferably	find	it	in	several	articles,	
as	 there	 are	 no	 eternity	 clauses.	 In	 the	 judgement	 of	 contrast	 or	 verification,	 the	 Court	 has	 to	
establish	 whether	 the	 essential	 element	 was	 replaced	 by	 another	 one	 and	 whether	 the	 new	
element	is	so	distinct	as	to	be	incompatible	with	the	constitutional	identity	(Ramírez	Cleves,	2006;	
Quince	Ramírez,	2006;	Quince	Ramírez,	2008;	Bernal	Pulido,	2013).	
Later	 on,	 the	 replacement	 doctrine	 has	 been	 applied	 to	 highly	 politicized	 issues,	 from	 the	
reelection	 of	 the	 President4	 to	 the	 recent	 peace	 process5.	 This	 doctrine	 of	 the	 Colombian	
Constitutional	 Court	 has	 triggered	 any	 kind	 of	 reactions	 in	 scholarship	 and	 public	 opinion,	
spanning	from	endorsement	and	admiration	to	strong	criticism	toward	the	activism	of	the	Court.	
A	few	scholars	have	argued	that	the	Court	exercised	a	power	that	it	did	not	have,	abusing	its	
role	 in	the	system	and	lacking	democratic	 legitimacy,	or	have	examined	specific	cases	to	prove	a	
misuse	of	 the	 replacement	doctrine	both	as	a	 too	broad	and	 (more	 rarely)	 too	narrow	concept.	
The	main	 arguments	 brought	 about	 against	 the	 doctrine	 are	 textual	 and	 are	 based,	 on	 the	 one	
hand,	on	the	absence	of	any	eternity	clause	in	the	constitution	and,	on	the	other	hand,	on	Article	
241	and	its	express	reference	to	procedural	grounds.	Also,	the	use	of	the	doctrine	by	the	Court	has	
been	 considered	 as	 an	 example	 of	 judicial	 activism	 and	 (too)	 extensive	 interpretation	 of	 its	
																																								 																				4	Judgments	C-1040/2005	to	C-1057/2005	and	then	C-141/2010.	5	For	instance,	Judgment	C-332/2017	(on	which	see	Ragone,	2017).	
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functions,	particularly	because	it	disposes	of	a	notable	margin	of	maneuver	when	deciding	what	is	
subject	or	not	to	constitutional	change.	
The	 main	 arguments	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 replacement	 doctrine	 are	 based	 on	 the	 needs	 for	 a	
common	 ethical	 ground;	 for	 the	 prevention	 of	 abuses	 by	 political	 power;	 for	 the	 protection	 of	
fundamental	rights	and	basic	principles	-	in	particular,	the	separation	of	powers	in	the	context	of	a	
hyperpresidentialism	-	that	define	the	identity	of	the	constitution	and	the	violation	of	which	would	
be	a	breach	of	the	system	itself	(Ramírez	Cleves,	2016;	Guastini,	2017).		
The	Elaboration	of	 the	Yardstick	 for	Adjudication	on	Constitutional	
Amendments		
The	yardstick	comprises	the	norms	on	how	to	pass	constitutional	amendment	(unless	they	are	
the	 object	 of	 the	 amendment,	 obviously),	 plus	 the	 eternity	 clauses	 included	 in	 the	 constitution	
(like	in	the	German	or	Italian	case,	but	also	other	cases).	
The	idea	of	the	existence	of	an	irreformable	core	has	been	supported	by	many	authors	over	
the	decades:	one	can	think	of	W.L.	Marbury,	who	referred	to	the	express	prohibition	of	the	reform	
of	equal	representation	of	the	States	in	the	Senate	of	the	United	States	to	endorse	constitutional	
adjudication	checking	the	fulfilment	of	the	hard	core	of	the	constitution	(Marbury,	1919-20);	W.F.	
Murphy	 relied	 on	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 verb	 “to	 amend”,	 in	 which	 a	 total	 modification	 of	 the	
fundamental	Charter	could	not	be	contained	(Murphy,	1995).	One	can	also	recall	M.	de	la	Cueva,	
which	referred	to	the	supreme	principles	of	legal	certainty	and	judicial	control	of	acts	adopted	by	
public	authorities,	alongside	the	necessary	existence	of	individual	complaints	(de	la	Cueva,	1982).	
I.	 Burgoa	 Orihuela	 (1985)	 also	 argued	 that	 there	 are	 essential	 elements	 that	 represent	 the	
fundamental	 political	 decisions	 of	 the	 people.	 The	 Italian	 doctrine	 has	 widely	 endorsed	 the	
existence	 of	 substantial	 limits	 that	 are	 found	 in	 the	 supreme	 principles,	 and	 the	 Constitutional	
Court	 adopted	 this	 position,	 as	 outlined	 above.	 The	 same	did	 the	 Peruvian	 Constitutional	 Court	
with	reference	to	dignity,	equality,	right	to	life,	popular	sovereignty	and	the	rule	of	law6.	
These	 theorists	and	Courts	went	 in	 the	same	direction	as	 the	 Indian	and	South	African	case	
law	based	on	the	idea	of	a	complex	of	principles	and	values	that	determine	the	“basic	structure”	of	
the	constitution	and	consequently	are	irreformable.	
In	South	Africa,	the	first	case	decided	with	respect	to	this	issue	focused	on	the	reform	of	the	
1993	Transitional	constitution,	made	through	the	Second	Amendment	Act,	n.	44	of	1995	(the	1995	
constitutional	amendment),	in	relation	to	Articles	149,	182,	184	and	245	of	the	constitution.	With	
that	 ruling,	 the	 Court	 clarified	 that	 a	 reform	 contrary	 to	 a	 constitutional	 clause	 represents	 a	
“physiological”	 hypothesis	 (otherwise	 it	 would	 not	 be	 a	 reform),	 provided	 that	 it	 is	 adopted	
respecting	 the	 necessary	 procedure7.	 Nevertheless,	 after	 dealing	 with	 the	 procedural	
requirements,	 the	 Court	 addressed	 a	 more	 complex	 issue,	 that	 is,	 the	 existence	 or	 not	 of	 a	
constitutional	“spirit”	to	which	reference	should	be	made	in	order	to	assess	the	legitimacy	of	the	
reform,	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 formal	 vices.	 The	 judges	 affirmed	 that	 an	 amendment,	 formally	
valid,	 that	 implied	 a	 radical	 restructuring	 of	 the	 fundamentals	 of	 the	 constitution,	 could	 not	 be	
																																								 																				6	Cases	n.	014-2002-AI/TC;	n.	0006-2003-AI/TC;	n.	014-2003-AI/TC;	n.	050-2004-AI/TC.	On	these	cases,	see	Bernales	Ballesteros	(2005),	García	Belaunde	(2006)	Eto	Cruz	(2009).	7	 Judgment	CCT	36/95:	 “it	may	perhaps	be	 that	 a	purported	amendment	 to	 the	Constitution,	 following	 the	 formal	procedures	prescribed	by	the	Constitution,	but	radically	and	fundamentally	restructuring	and	re-organizing	the	fundamental	premises	of	the	Constitution,	might	not	qualify	as	an	 ‘amendment’	at	all”.	For	a	 comprehensive	 introduction	 to	constitutional	 interpretation	 in	South	Africa,	see	Fowkes	(2016).	
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considered	 an	 amendment	 stricto	 sensu;	 in	 addition,	 the	 Court	 implicitly	 reserved	 for	 itself	 the	
power	to	assess	when	an	amendment	“abrogates	or	destroys	the	constitution”	(Sarkin,	1997).	
This	 position	 was	 confirmed	 and	 broadened	 in	 posterior	 jurisprudence,	 starting	 with	 CCT	
23/02,	 in	 which	 the	 Court	 ratified	 two	 pillars	 of	 its	 own	 function:	 an	 amendment	 that	 would	
undermine	the	basic	structure	of	the	constitution	could	not	be	considered	as	a	proper	application	
of	 the	 amending	 power	 regulated	 by	 Article	 74	 of	 the	 constitution;	 similarly,	 a	modification	 of	
founding	values	 set	out	 in	 section	1	could	be	done	exclusively	 respecting	 the	specific	procedure	
established	by	the	constitution	(there	are	therefore	no	limits).	Later	on,	the	Court	referred	to	the	
set	of	targets	 indicated	 in	the	preamble	of	the	constitution,	that	 is,	the	construction	of	a	society	
based	on	democracy	and	social	 justice,	as	well	as	a	system	of	government	based	on	the	popular	
will.	In	the	same	context,	the	Court	explained	some	of	the	founding	values:	human	dignity,	party	
pluralism,	 alongside	 a	 democratic,	 representative	 and	 participative	 order	 that	 guarantees	
accountability,	responsiveness	and	openness8.	
The	denominations	given	 to	unamendable	principles	by	Constitutional	Courts,	 in	addition	 to	
concepts	 like	 identity,	basic	structure	and	the	supreme	principles,	also	 include	the	“spirit”	of	the	
constitution	and	the	“fundamental	political	decisions”.		
The	 real	 issue	 becomes	 precisely	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 principles	 that	 reflect	 such	
fundamental	decisions.	
In	 the	 light	 of	 the	 comparative	 research	 I	 have	 carried	 out	 over	 the	 past	 decade,	 trying	 to	
extrapolate	 which	 elements	 compose	 the	 specific	 yardstick	 identifiable	 as	 identity	 or	 basic	
structure,	 a	 bottom-up	 perspective	 is	 to	 be	 preferred.	 The	 advantages	 of	 such	 perspective	 are	
twofold:	on	 the	one	hand,	 this	approach	values	 the	 role	of	Constitutional	Courts	when	 they	are	
obliged	to	use	and/or	create	notions	of	general	theory;	and	on	the	other	hand,	the	basic	structure	
determined	 in	 this	 way	 does	 not	 represent	 a	 pre-conception,	 but	 rather	 leads	 to	
phenomenological,	empirical	data.	
It	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 all	 the	 limits	 to	 constitutional	 amendments,	 regardless	 of	 their	
denomination,	somehow	relate	to	the	same	concept,	that	 is,	the	form	of	State	 in	a	broad	sense:	
the	value	always	referred	to,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	is	democracy,	followed	by	its	corollaries	such	as	
popular	sovereignty,	pluralism,	separation	of	powers	and	fundamental	rights.	To	these	concepts,	
the	 legal	 systems	 add	 specifications	 connected	 with	 their	 own	 fundamental	 principles.	 In	 my	
opinion,	 all	 the	 various	 aspects	 at	 stake,	 that	 is,	 the	 guarantee	 of	 rights,	 popular	 sovereignty,	
pluralism	 and	 the	 separation	 of	 powers	 coagulate	 around	 democracy.	 However,	 for	 this	
construction	 to	 be	 maintained,	 a	 further	 corollary	 is	 necessary:	 constitutional	 supremacy	 (a	
principle	 mentioned	 to	 sustain	 its	 own	 role	 by	 a	 large	 part	 of	 jurisprudence9),	 which	 ensures	
continuity	and	stability	in	the	system	and	is	logically	related	to	all	elements	already	mentioned.		
The	 Scope	 of	 the	 Principles	 of	 the	 “Basic	 Structure”	 of	 the	
Constitution:	Comparative	Conclusions		
When	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 yardstick,	 recalling	 what	 Italian,	 German	 and	 Peruvian	
jurisprudence	 (but	 not	 only	 these	 ones)	 affirmed	 about	 rights,	 it	 seems	 necessary	 to	 recall	 and	
																																								 																				8	See	Matatiele	Municipality	and	others	versus	President	of	 the	Republic	of	South	Africa	and	others	 (27th	February	2006),	 so-called	Matatiele	 I	 and	 also	 CCT	 73/05,	 judgment	Matatiele	Municipality	 and	 others	 versus	 President	 of	 the	Republic	 of	 South	Africa	and	others	(18th	of	August,	2006),	so-called	Matatiele	II.	9	 One	 can	 find	 this	 reference	 in	 the	 Argentinian	 case	 Fayt	 (1999);	 as	 well	 as	 in	 judgment	 C-551/2003	 of	 the	 Colombian	Constitutional	Court	or	980-91	of	the	Costa	Rican	Court.	
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reiterate	that	all	principles	assumed	as	yardsticks	of	the	constitutionality	of	amendments,	as	the	
extrema	 ratio,	 have	 to	 be	 interpreted	 restrictively,	 that	 is,	 in	 their	 essential	 content.	 In	 other	
words,	what	the	amending	power	cannot	do	is	to	eliminate	one	element	of	the	basic	structure	of	
the	constitutional	order,	but	 it	 is	not	 forbidden	 to	perform	certain	 “reasonable”	variations.	As	a	
consequence,	 the	norms	 to	be	 looked	at	as	yardsticks	are	 restricted	 to	 the	minimum	content	of	
the	corresponding	fundamental	rights	or	basic	principles.	
Of	 course,	 these	 principles	 are	 broad	 enough	 to	 become	 at	 least	 partially	 unstable	 and	
undergo	modifications,	as	they	are	applied	in	changing	societies.	In	this	context,	the	interpretation	
of	every	value	performed	by	Constitutional	Courts	is	essential.	Such	a	function,	of	course,	cannot	
be	exercised	with	total	discretion	on	the	part	of	constitutional	judges,	who	may	create	and	adapt	
the	yardstick,	while	being	called	to	interpret	the	norms	taking	into	account	the	principles	already	
present	 in	 the	 constitution.	 This	 exegetical	 operation	 does	 not	 imply	 usurpation	 of	 political	
powers,	 but	 the	 exercise	 of	 the	 interpretational	 role	 of	 Courts,	 as	 long	 as	 it	 is	 performed	with	
sufficient	self-restraint.	
As	it	was	previously	recalled,	in	my	research	I	have	taken	into	account	the	contribution	that	all	
“formants”	 give	 to	 the	 configuration	 of	 the	 yardstick.	 Basically,	 in	 all	 jurisdictions	 there	 is	 a	
prevalence	of	the	case	law,	in	many	cases	endorsed	or	preceded	by	consistent	scholarship.	
Such	 a	 result	 was	 foreseeable	 in	 those	 systems	 in	 which	 constitutional	 adjudication	 of	
amendments	 was	 claimed	 by	 the	 corresponding	 Court	 and	 not	 expressly	 allotted	 to	 it	 by	 the	
constitution;	nevertheless,	the	same	can	be	said	about	the	other	 legal	systems	analyzed.	Even	in	
the	presence	of	explicit	norms,	more	or	less	specific	and	detailed,	the	greatest	creator	of	the	rules	
(especially	in	relation	to	the	yardstick	and	its	scope)	are	Constitutional/Supreme	Courts.	
Many	 Courts	 have	 tried	 (and	 still	 try)	 to	 defend	 the	 idea	 according	 to	which	 the	 amending	
power	 given	 to	 the	 Parliament	 is	 a	 limited	 power,	 directed	 mainly	 to	 “constitutional	
maintenance”.	 So	 did	 the	 Colombian	 Constitutional	 Court	 and	 the	 Italian	 one	 in	 the	
abovementioned	 case	 law.	 But	 also,	 in	 judgment	 Fayt	 (1999),	 the	 Argentinian	 Supreme	 Court	
further	argued	that	in	order	to	respect	the	separation	of	powers	and	the	principle	of	supremacy	of	
the	 constitution,	 each	 body	 has	 the	 obligation	 to	 act	 within	 its	 competence	 and	 not	 beyond.	
Consequently,	 the	 judiciary	 in	 general	 (and	 the	 Court	 itself	 in	 particular)	 must	 assess	 the	
limitations	 of	 the	 powers	 of	 such	 bodies.	 Judicial	 intervention	 becomes,	 therefore,	 essential	 to	
guarantee	constitutional	supremacy.	
In	fact,	according	to	this	case	law,	if	there	are	limits	to	constitutional	reforms,	it	is	necessary	
that	there	is	also	a	subject	entitled	to	enforce	them.	If	violations	of	the	constitution	were	allowed	
and	no	remedy	provided,	 legal	certainty	would	be	affected,	precisely	because	the	constitution	 is	
the	source	from	which	all	other	sources	take	their	legitimation.	
Limits	 to	amendments,	 in	 fact,	are	directed	 in	 the	 first	place	 to	political	actors,	 in	particular	
the	 legislator	and	the	government.	Only	secondarily	they	concern	constitutional	Courts.	The	first	
guarantee	 of	 respect	 for	 these	 limits	 needs	 to	 be	 the	 self-restraint	 of	 political	 forces,	 if	 a	 truly	
democratic	and	pluralist	 system	must	be	based	on	a	culture	of	constitutional	ethics,	oriented	 to	
sharing	and	spreading	the	founding	values	of	the	legal	system.	The	intervention	of	Courts	happens	
only	 at	 a	 later	point,	 in	 those	 cases	where	 there	has	been	an	abuse	of	power	by	 the	 legislative	
and/or	the	executive.	
In	conclusion,	Constitutional	Courts’	 judgments	are	not	placed	 in	a	 legal	and	social	 vacuum.	
On	the	contrary,	they	can	and	should	refer	to	local	and	foreign	scholarship,	as	well	as	to	the	case	
law	 of	 other	 judicial	 bodies.	 Several	 major	 theses	 related	 to	 constitutional	 adjudication	 on	
constitutional	amendments	seem	to	be	circulating	 in	 judgments	of	different	 jurisdictions,	mostly	
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implicitly,	 but	 sometimes	 also	 expressly:	 from	 the	 idea	 of	 constitutional	 adjudication	 on	
constitutional	amendments	as	the	extrema	ratio	 to	the	vice	of	competence,	from	the	concept	of	
fundamental	 political	 decisions	 to	 the	 abuse	 of	 power,	 among	 others.	 The	 idea	 itself	 of	 “basic	
structure”	has	been	quoted	in	other	jurisdictions	explicitly	(in	the	same	continent	but	also	further	
away,	like	in	Colombia),	and	even	when	it	is	not	the	case,	it	is	known.	Circulation	can	be	detected	
both	within	 the	 same	 formant	 and	 throughout	 crossing	 formants,	 even	 if	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	
subject	frequently	leads	Courts	to	a	moderate	(or	null)	use	of	foreign	cases,	especially	those	Courts	
that	are	usually	reluctant	to	refer	to	comparative	law.		
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